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The Seventh Army Symphony Orchestra
A.P.O. 46, New York, N.Y.

20 December, 1961

AN OPEN LETTER FROM MEMBERS OF THE SEVENTH ARMY SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA:

Dear Sirs:

The Seventh Army Symphony Orchestra in Stuttgart, Germany, is in a state

of crisis. Several members of the Orchestra have written their Congressmen and Senators in an effort to bring high level attention to the matter

in hope that a solution will be affected. The Inspector General units at

our level have not been informed of our concern. We believe that after

nine years of association with the Orchestra and its constant replacement problems, they would be too opinionated or disinterested to take appropriate corrective action. Moreover, we are convinced that the problem is of a nature that will require large scale effort by major policy-making bodies in and out of the Army.

We hope that through this letter we may bring widespread attention and publicity in the United States to these problems, and that steps will be taken which will guarantee the Orchestra's future in the Army at a consistent high standard, ending once and for all the perennial threats to the existence of such an organization. The only legitimate reason for disbanding the Orchestra in the Army would be the advent of a full scale Third World War. Until such a time may come, the Orchestra can and should be maintained in the United States Army; the Orchestra's record substantiates this.

For nine years the Orchestra has existed as a unit of the Seventh Army in Germany, sustained by luck and word-of-mouth replacements; yet in spite of this hand-to-mouth existence, the Orchestra has proven its value over and over during its nine years as an effective propaganda unit. During the Cold War, such effective instruments are hard to find. We are enclosing a typical review of a recent concert by one of our chamber groups. Please notice that it does not dwell exclusively on German-American musical conparisons. This is not the first time the Orchestra has stimulated favorable printed comment on the positive elements of American life. Such orchestral activities also provoke spoken comment in the same favorable vein which penetrate even further into European homes, schools and factories.

In order that you may fully understand the problems, we should like to present the history of events which have brought the Orchestra to this crisis, the present situation with both its immediate and long range consequences, and, finally, our suggestions relative to correcting this situation.

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The obscurity of the Orchestra in the United States has always been

the primary cause of the Orchestra's basic problems: replacements. Accounts of the Orchestra have always reached the States through its own members. Because of a lack of any official information program to the States, the reputation of the Orchestra has been very inconsistent. Irregardless of the Orchestra's actual condition at anyone time, rumors have often related tales of the Orchestra's imminent disbanding. And yet, it is from the United States that the replacements must come.

This chronic obscurity has been nurtured by the policy-making body directly above the Orchestra. A basic lack of understanding on the part

of this administrative body, coupled with apathy in times when no immediate crises exist and a general disinterest has contributed to this obscurity. These factors have made it easy for zealous leaders of other musical groups in the Army to channel large numbers of highly qualified personnel away from the Orchestra into their own units.

The present crisis brought on by personnel shortages is not the first in the Orchestra's history. In 1954 there was a shortage of players with no replacements in sight. The late Dimitri Mitropolous came to its rescue, stating that with a little attention the Orchestra could again be a successful organization. The Army found players in its own ranks to bolster the critical personnel shortage.

Another chronic problem has been in finding properly qualified men for the podium. Traditionally an enlisted man who auditioned before the members and was considered qualified was subsequently chosen to be conductor. On several occasions that person proved to be inept and personally unable to deal with the problems of daily music-making. Before he could be replaced in favor of a more competent individual, the musical standard and group morale had to suffer. The last time this situation existed was in November 1960. A more competent individual could not be found in the ranks of the Orchestra membership. Consequently the then current Commanding Officer contacted civilian professional conductors to assume temporary directorship. This same Officer also conducted, thereby setting a precedent: he was the first Officer to conduct the Orchestra on a continuing basis.

In June 1961, when the personnel shortage became acute (E.g. only one cello and no flutes), the Orchestra became operative only in chamber groups. The Commanding Officer felt that such activities were necessary to keep the unit's name before the public. He was devoting his full time and energies in a concentrated campaign to locate qualified players for the Orchestra when he was suddenly and without explanation transferred to a non-musical assignment in the Seventh Army Stuttgart command. This change was in late August, 1961.

His successor, the current Commanding Officer, came from an administrative post (Commanding Officer of the Army Element of the Naval School of Music, Washington D.C.) to an Army Post Office assignment in Stuttgart in October 1960. It has been officially stated that he was brought to Stuttgart specifically to assume command of the Orchestra.

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Although it is evident that the current Commanding Officer had no control over the events leading up to the present crisis, he accepted the assignment and has devoted his full energies to solving the problem of getting replacements with all the zeal and influence he can muster. However, he and those responsible for his being here neglected to consider these most critical factors: he is not a formally trained musician, does not possess a Baccalaureate degree and has had no professional orchestral training or experience. He has demonstrated this before both the Orchestra and the public; critical newspaper response from the recent tour will bear this out. All members of the Orchestra, and especially those who will devote their lives to music and the arts, are unanimous in their feeling: they do not respect him as a musician.

His qualifications are a matter of record. The most valid and impressive accomplishment in terms of orchestral experience is an opportunity he had in the summer of 1940 to become a bass instrumentalist in the M-G-M Orchestra on the basis of a personal recommendation. He did not accept this position because of his entry into active duty with the California National Guard. All of his Army experience has been with bands, and more than half of this experience has been of an administrative nature. Most of his musical accomplishments are of the "feather in the cap" variety, not actually being accomplishments, but rather associations with others who did become recognized as musicians.

The Army has placed the fate of the Orchestra in this man's hands. He has stated unequivically that he has been given the authority to disband the Orchestra if he feels that such a unit is unfeasible. Decisions of this nature should only be within the province of high level policy makers who are more cognizant of international relations and effective use of propaganda machinery. That a situation exists whereby such an important decision rests with any one individual below this high level, is deplorable.

Since October the Orchestra has been operating in a state of musical compromise. In spite of those serious shortages in key chairs, orchestral works have been presented, along with solo and chamber selections on the same program.

The immediate effect resulting from all these factors is a low musical standard and unstable morale.

As a result of this present situation, the Orchestra already suffers an alarmingly low reputation in the United States. This reputation is fatal to the life blood of the Orchestra: replacements. Musicians of top calibre will go elsewhere in the services rather than come to an Orchestra of questionable reputation. It cannot be overlooked that there are bands and other string groups in the services. Furthermore a qualified civilian musician of draft age still has the opportunity to choose his service.

Approximately 75 % of the current membership of the Orchestra, including all of the key players, will be discharged by July 1962.

If the Army and the citizens of the United States, speaking through

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their Congressmen, agree that the Orchestra is a valuable asset in the Cold War and should be maintained, then it is apparent that immediate measures must be initiated in order to save it.

We wish to make the following recommendations, based on our training, musical experience, and our experience in the Orchestra itself. We are confident that measures can be initiated which will permanently establish the Orchestra, thereby resolving the present crisis and eliminating the possibility of any future crises.

However, if this is to be accomplished, this premise must be acknowledged: the Orchestra's problems are not typical of those of an average Army unit. The need for flexibility is paramount in solving the problems which are unique to a Symphony Orchestra.

What follows are our suggestions:

1) The Orchestra be the United States Army Symphony Orchestra. Being the only organization of its kind in the U.S. Army, it should be controlled through direct channels from Washington. The most direct channel is the United States Headquarters in Europe (USAREUR) at Heidelberg.

2) In making such a move, adequate billeting facilities should include quarters where the hours of the Orchestra would not conflict with the hours of other Army units. This building would have rehearsal, practicing and recording facilities necessary to the function of an orchestra.

3) The Orchestra must have a Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). This includes the following: a rank structure comparable to that of special Military Bands; effective requisitioning priority; direct enlistment contracts. Such a reorganizing move should also include the following administrative posts: a) A Commanding Officer and Musical Director who would have a working knowledge of orchestral problems and a background in serious music. As in all of the services, if a man is needed in a special field for which there is no school, he is sent for the necessary training to a recognized university where he may obtain that training. A semester or two auditing classes at an outstanding conservatory would give a potential orchestra Commanding Officer a solid basis upon which to make decisions which would affect musical operations. b) An Administrative Officer whose duties would entail remaining at the home station, overseeing the booking of concerts and tours, advance work, requisiting of replacements, and act as laison representative to other units; c) An Executive Officer who would travel with the Orchestra and attend the various public affairs and receptions. This would necessitate his being multi-lingual. He would also attend to the problems of military discipline and on-the-road administrative problems. It is essential that the Executive Officer be a well educated person with a proven record of positive rational judgment. On the basis of his former superiors' recommendations, he must have proven himself to be highly efficient and well respected. An interest in foreign relations and cultural affairs is also very desireable. Members now in the Orchestra know specifically

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of several men in the Army who are emminently qualified for these posts. Also included in a TO&E should be a group of at least four non-playing persons sent with the Orchestra as stage-hands. At present the players are obliged to load and unload heavy and dangerous equipment. This ruins the players' dexterity and flexibility essential for consistent performance. It has brought serious injury to their hands, leaving them unable to perform for days, and upon several occasions, for several months. In the case of first-chair players, this could bring about a serious compromise in standard.

4) Once a year an advisory body of three people renowned in music circles should review the Orchestra's operations. For this purpose a study should be presented annually by the administration and the first-chair players. This advisory body, being detached from both the military and the Orchestra, would thereby provide the authority guaranteeing a consistent musical standard.

5) As a result of their close daily association with civilian musical life, this advisory body, would be in a position to solve the problem of having qualified conductors. On the basis of their knowledge and names submitted to them by interested parties, they would be able to recommend conductors for the subsequent season.

6) A good publicity department would make known to both potential European audiences and the American public (from whence replacements must come) the accomplishments, high standards and unique nature of the Orchestra. In order to achieve these results, the publicity and booking staff should be comprised of people trained in their jobs and interested in their field. This also applies to the audio engineer, whose duties are an integral part of the Orchestra's information program. Professionally trained men with experience who know their business thoroughly, could combine their knowledge and efficiency with imagination and vitality.

7) Any organization of professional level must be able to rid itself of incompetent personnel. In the past, inflexibility relative to the "no transfer from a station for two years" policy has resulted in the sustenence of much dead weight and incompetent personnel. This is fatal to the professional standards and morale of the unit.

8) Army policy states that all individuals must be given advanced training in their occupational specialty. The need for advanced training in most Army occupations is an acknowledged fact; however, in the case of professionally trained musicians, this is not necessary. In fact, that time which players spend in advanced Army training could be more effectively utilized in performing with the Orchestra.

9) String players must have a specific MOS (Military Occupation Specialty) number. In the past, valuable players have been inadvertantly channeled into non-musical units because of the Army's lack of provisions in classifying string players. They form approximately 50% of the playing membership in an orchestra. Although there is not an over-abundance of

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string players, every music school graduates more than enough qualified male string instrumentalists every year to fill the ranks of an orchestra in the Army. However, many of these people are being detoured into less vital activities in the military. It would help if the number of less important 11 "cocktail-type" string groups within the military were reduced in order that qualified players could contribute their talents in the more important area of international relations.

10) Advantage should be taken of the past and present high standards reached by the Orchestra and its chamber groups. Tapes of outstanding performances should be sent to networks in the areas where a high cultural standard exists. On these same broadcasts, a positive description of the Orchestra's mission and its duty presented in a way appealing to the professional players would serve a twofold purpose: the people could hear and judge the music for themselves, and they would also be informed that the Army was supporting the Orchestra by sponsoring such a program. In addition, imaginative brochures and posters could be distributed to all recruiting stations, music schools, universities and conservatories of known high musical standards.

The standard of the Orchestra cannot be maintained at a high level unless potential members are auditioned in person. A team of people now in the Orchestra with established reputations could be sent TDY (Temporary Duty Status) to the six or so cultural metropolitan areas to audition qualified players, recruit and sell the Orchestra to them. Musicians are quicker to take the word of their established colleagues than the word of career servicemen representing ways of life unfamiliar to a civilian. In future years this element of sustaining the Orchestra's membership would be done effectively by a yearly tour of the States. Nothing is as impressive as personal contact and live concerts in recruiting members to an orchestra.

11) The Orchestra is hindered by not being able to invest in sound business policies of the nature which build a reputation. It should be able to invite conductors and soloists of note, regardless of nationality or sex. Former members of the Orchestra, many who are now at the top of their profession, would also play an important role in building this reputation. Concerts and recordings featuring alumni would provide examples of the high standard consistently maintained in the Orchestra.

We are convinced that these things can be ultimate reality. By September, 1962 the orchestra should be fully operational again as an orchestra. Since most of us here now will be out of the Army by July, 1962, we don't expect to be participants in the activities of the United States Army Symphony Orchestra. Our personal satisfaction will be to read and hear of its achievements in future years.

Although there has been a large draft call recently, we suspect the qualified players were already enrolled in school, obtained deferments for previously contracted jobs or enlisted in a band. Graduation is the end of May. Eight weeks' basic training and subsequent assignment

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to the orchestra means that by September 1st, 1962, the new orchestra would begin its first tour. One year from then the good reputation of the United States Army Symphony Orchestra should be known to every musician and music lover in both America and Europe. With that foundation it would be only a short time before its world fame were an established fact. We hope we are not alone in this conviction and that action will be taken which will help the orchestra achieve this ultimate goal.

Respectfully,

Members of the Seventh United States Army Symphony Orchestra in Europe, whose names appear below:

Gerald K. Appleman
Byron M. Norell
Lauren R. Jakey
Charles A. Lepusky
George B. Randall
John B. Graham
Robert W. Jones
Henry W. Boerner III
John B. Holmberg
Gilbert M. Mc Kelvie
James D. Hughart
Paul F. Stapel
Peter W. Gano

Herbert L. Hartshorn
Richard C. Larson
Arthur R. Johnson
Richard N. Grider
Edmund E. Moore

Gary B. Krapfl
Norman Cohen

William R. Super
Jesse L. Davis
Donald Draganski
Wayne A. Angel
Raphael B. Feinstein